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Incident reportCredential phishing campaignReport version 1 · November 21, 2026

Storm-2372 device code phishing

Microsoft reported device code phishing against government, NGO, technology, defense, telecommunications, health, education and energy organizations. In July 2026 Microsoft assessed Storm-2372 as an initial access sub-cluster of Midnight Blizzard.

ReportedAttribution: Midnight Blizzard sub-cluster (assessed July 2026)Reference data · public sources

01Executive assessment

  • ReportedThe campaign has been active since August 2024. [1]
  • ReportedTargets were in Europe, North America, Africa and the Middle East. [1]

Implication: organizations in the affected sectors should confirm whether the access paths described in the sources apply to their own environment. A matching sector or technology is a reason to examine exposure, not evidence of compromise.

02What happened

Microsoft reported device code phishing against government, NGO, technology, defense, telecommunications, health, education and energy organizations. In July 2026 Microsoft assessed Storm-2372 as an initial access sub-cluster of Midnight Blizzard.

Incident type
Credential phishing campaign
Event period
August 2024
Date precision
month
Evidence basis
Vendor research publication, later updated
Sectors
Government, Non-governmental organizations, IT services, Defense, Telecommunications, Health, Higher education, Energy

Active since August 2024, as stated by the source.

03Evidence chronology

Publication dateDevelopmentTypeSource
February 13, 2025Microsoft publishes device code phishing research.Campaign disclosure[1]
July 31, 2026Microsoft assesses Storm-2372 as a Midnight Blizzard sub-cluster.Attribution update[1]

Event dates, source publication dates and our observation time (November 21, 2026) are recorded separately. Observation time is when DarkFire first collected the record, not when the activity occurred.

04Targets and geography

TargetRoleLocationPrecision and basis
Organizations in multiple sectors (unnamed)Campaign targets, region level onlyEurope, North America, Africa, Middle EastNo location stated by source

Regions named by the source: Europe, North America, Africa, Middle East. Regional scope is shown in the list, not as map points.

Locations describe affected organizations or countries as stated by the sources. They never indicate where an attacker operates from.

05Attribution assessment

Assessed by
Microsoft
Confidence
moderate confidence initially; sub-cluster assessment added 2026-07-31
Sources
[1]

DarkFire aggregates attribution published by the named assessing organization; it does not make its own attribution. Event evidence, actor attribution and location precision are separate judgments.

06Technical behavior

ATT&CKTechnique
T1566Phishing

Techniques listed here are the behaviors described for this incident, not the actor's full ATT&CK catalog.

EVIDENCEACTOR AND TECHNIQUESMicrosoft Threat IntelligenceFebruary 13, 2025APT29 / Cozy BearMicrosoftPhishingT1566Organizations in multip…

07Software and indicators

No publicly shareable indicators are recorded for this incident.

08Business exposure and priorities

Organizations in government, non-governmental organizations, it services, defense should review whether they share the conditions described in the sources: the same technology, supplier relationships or access paths. Relevance is a reason to examine exposure, not a finding of compromise.

The APT29 dossier sets out defender priorities for this actor's documented behaviors.

09Defensive actions

Inventory non-production tenants, dormant accounts and application identities alongside production users. Assign an owner and business purpose to each, remove access that is no longer required and examine high-privilege grants. Review device enrollment and session policies. These actions address the types of identity exposure described in the joint cloud advisory; implementation should account for the organization's actual services and authentication design.

Inspect supplier and application trust. Identify which providers can administer accounts, read mail or distribute software, and determine what evidence would reveal misuse. Retain identity and mail audit events in a form investigators can correlate across accounts and applications. During a suspected intrusion, evaluate consent grants, credentials, sessions and persistence together. A password reset addresses one mechanism and should not be treated as evidence that every access path has been removed.

From the APT29 dossier. For each action, name a control owner, the supporting evidence and a completion criterion.

10Analytic gaps

  • The source does not name the affected organizations.
  • No location is stated by the source, so the incident is not placed on the map.
  • The core claims rest on a single publishing organization; independent corroboration has not been recorded.
  • Whether access persists at any affected organization is unknown unless newer evidence is published.

11Source notes and changes

  1. [1]Storm-2372 conducts device code phishing campaignMicrosoft Threat Intelligence · published February 13, 2025 · updated 2026-07-31 · collected November 21, 2026

Version 1, published November 21, 2026. No corrections recorded. Report an error to have it reviewed; corrections and retractions keep the previous version visible.