01Executive assessment
- ReportedRIKEN believes an unknown party attacked the service between November 10 and 13, 2026. [1]
- ReportedRIKEN identified 4,222 Fugaku users and 375 Rikyu users as potentially affected and found no evidence that research datasets were disclosed. [1]
Implication: organizations in the affected sectors should confirm whether the access paths described in the sources apply to their own environment. A matching sector or technology is a reason to examine exposure, not evidence of compromise.
02What happened
RIKEN took the Fugaku supercomputer offline after a suspected attack between November 10 and 13, 2026. Malware was found on affected servers and account data for about 4,600 users may be affected.
- Incident type
- Suspected intrusion
- Event period
- November 10, 2026
- Date precision
- day
- Evidence basis
- News reporting of the organization's statement
- Sectors
- Research
As stated by the cited reporting. Current collection, November 2026.
03Evidence chronology
| Publication date | Development | Type | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| November 13, 2026 | Compromised credentials used against Fugaku; machine taken offline. | Organization statement (reported) | [1] |
| November 21, 2026 | TechRadar reports the suspected attack. | News report | [1] |
Event dates, source publication dates and our observation time (November 21, 2026) are recorded separately. Observation time is when DarkFire first collected the record, not when the activity occurred.
04Targets and geography
| Target | Role | Location | Precision and basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| RIKEN (Fugaku) | Affected organization, named by reporting | Kobe, Hyogo, Japan | city · Facility location as listed by the incident aggregator |
Locations describe affected organizations or countries as stated by the sources. They never indicate where an attacker operates from.
05Attribution assessment
- Attributed actor
- Not attributed
- Assessed by
- No assessment
- Confidence
- unknown
- Sources
DarkFire aggregates attribution published by the named assessing organization; it does not make its own attribution. Event evidence, actor attribution and location precision are separate judgments.
06Technical behavior
No incident-specific procedure evidence has been recorded yet.
Techniques listed here are the behaviors described for this incident, not the actor's full ATT&CK catalog.
07Software and indicators
No publicly shareable indicators are recorded for this incident.
08Business exposure and priorities
Organizations in research should review whether they share the conditions described in the sources: the same technology, supplier relationships or access paths. Relevance is a reason to examine exposure, not a finding of compromise.
09Defensive actions
No actor-level defensive guidance is linked.
From the dossier. For each action, name a control owner, the supporting evidence and a completion criterion.
10Analytic gaps
- The core claims rest on a single publishing organization; independent corroboration has not been recorded.
- Whether access persists at any affected organization is unknown unless newer evidence is published.
11Source notes and changes
- [1]Japanese supercomputer hit by suspected cyberattackTechRadar · published November 21, 2026 · collected November 21, 2026
Version 1, published November 21, 2026. No corrections recorded. Report an error to have it reviewed; corrections and retractions keep the previous version visible.