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Incident reportCredential theft malwareReport version 1 · November 21, 2026

AUTHENTIC ANTICS credential and token theft

The NCSC attributed AUTHENTIC ANTICS malware, which steals login details and tokens, to APT28. It was discovered after a 2023 incident investigated by Microsoft and NCC Group; the affected organization is not named.

ReportedAttribution: GRU (APT28)Reference data · public sources

01Executive assessment

  • ReportedAUTHENTIC ANTICS steals victims' login details and tokens. [1]
  • ReportedThe malware was discovered after a 2023 cyber incident investigated by Microsoft and NCC Group. [1]

Implication: organizations in the affected sectors should confirm whether the access paths described in the sources apply to their own environment. A matching sector or technology is a reason to examine exposure, not evidence of compromise.

02What happened

The NCSC attributed AUTHENTIC ANTICS malware, which steals login details and tokens, to APT28. It was discovered after a 2023 incident investigated by Microsoft and NCC Group; the affected organization is not named.

Incident type
Credential theft malware
Event period
2023
Date precision
year
Evidence basis
Government attribution publication
Sectors
Not stated

Incident investigated in 2023, as stated by the source.

03Evidence chronology

Publication dateDevelopmentTypeSource
July 18, 2025NCSC attributes AUTHENTIC ANTICS to APT28.Attribution publication[1]

Event dates, source publication dates and our observation time (November 21, 2026) are recorded separately. Observation time is when DarkFire first collected the record, not when the activity occurred.

04Targets and geography

TargetRoleLocationPrecision and basis
Affected organization (unnamed)Incident victim, not named by sourceNot statedNo location stated by source

Locations describe affected organizations or countries as stated by the sources. They never indicate where an attacker operates from.

05Attribution assessment

Attributed actor
GRU (APT28)
Assessed by
UK National Cyber Security Centre
Confidence
stated by source
Sources
[1]

DarkFire aggregates attribution published by the named assessing organization; it does not make its own attribution. Event evidence, actor attribution and location precision are separate judgments.

06Technical behavior

ATT&CKTechnique
T1078.004Cloud Accounts

Techniques listed here are the behaviors described for this incident, not the actor's full ATT&CK catalog.

EVIDENCEACTOR AND TECHNIQUESUK National Cyber Security Ce…July 18, 2025APT28 / Fancy BearUK National Cyber Security CentreCloud AccountsT1078.004Affected organization (…

07Software and indicators

No publicly shareable indicators are recorded for this incident.

08Business exposure and priorities

Organizations in the affected sectors should review whether they share the conditions described in the sources: the same technology, supplier relationships or access paths. Relevance is a reason to examine exposure, not a finding of compromise.

The APT28 dossier sets out defender priorities for this actor's documented behaviors.

09Defensive actions

Identify externally managed routers and mail systems, assign accountable owners, verify supported software and review administrative access. For relevant Windows devices, verify remediation of the Print Spooler issue. Prioritize a documented inventory of applicable systems and controls over an unqualified assertion that the organization is protected.

Review abnormal mailbox access, new application permissions, token use and endpoint changes together. Preserve original timestamps and supporting logs before remediation. Where compromise is confirmed, use the organization's incident-response process to contain access, revoke affected credentials and sessions, and investigate persistence. Establish explicit completion criteria for each action so that response decisions can be reviewed against evidence.

From the APT28 dossier. For each action, name a control owner, the supporting evidence and a completion criterion.

10Analytic gaps

  • The source does not name the affected organizations.
  • No location is stated by the source, so the incident is not placed on the map.
  • The core claims rest on a single publishing organization; independent corroboration has not been recorded.
  • Whether access persists at any affected organization is unknown unless newer evidence is published.

11Source notes and changes

  1. [1]UK calls out Russian military intelligence for use of espionage toolUK National Cyber Security Centre · published July 18, 2025 · collected November 21, 2026

Version 1, published November 21, 2026. No corrections recorded. Report an error to have it reviewed; corrections and retractions keep the previous version visible.